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Beyond the Fraud Triangle

Enhancing Deterrence of Economic Crimes

MCK W. DORMINEY, PH. D- ;A SCOTT FLEMING. PH.T, CPA. CMA.-MARY-JD KRANACHF R. CFF.. MBA,
CPA/CFFiRICHAROA. KILtYJK., FH.O.rUhb.CPA/CFh

S*ptomb«rfOctotor 2011

Fraud avamtaare háve ušed the faudtríangie as a standard method stnce the 1950s to undecstsrd fraudsters'                               Acn
mofoatíons. However, tho tfiangte ismadequate for doterring, ^evanftog and detocting fatxl ůecaus© pre$$ire
andrationalization oennot be observod and do not aclequatety expfaín evay ocajrrencd offreud. Horo aro sune                           Boókslore
toofa that go further.

Adapter! front "Beyond the Rand Triangle, "publi&hed In ttreJufy 201ú íbsug ofThe CPA Jotmal, copyright 3010,
wth permisshn frvm the New York State Setiety ofCestifled PuMtc Arjcotu)lůnti< (NYSSCPA).

                            .—  tn 1976. Walmart hlrad Thomas Coughlin as dlredor
                                of lo$s prevemion. Ověř the years. Coughlíri worked
                                his wey up řn the orgarozetion to became vioe
                                chAmsn, one of the most powerfii pceitions In the
                                cfgariiation. But in lubníi 2005, Walmart1s hoard of
                                dirsctore forced Coughlin to resign amid alegafione of

                                fraud ari daceit.

                                                                             to an Apríl 6, 2005, artlde In The Wall Slreot Journal,
                                                                             reportéra James Band Iar and Ann ammermar wrate
                                                                             lhal "Mr, Coughlin periodfcally had subordinates
                                                                             creetefeke Invoicea to get Walmart to payforhb
                                                                             p$f5cnpl expense* The quESťanabie Bctívtty

                                                                             appeara to invotvo dozers of transactions over more
                                                                             than Rva years, indudíng huniing vaoallons, a $1,359

palrof aligátor bočte ciistcm rode fbr Mr. Coughlin and a $2.530 dog pen tor Mr. Coughlns Arkanses herně."

Accwťlrig to the adici e.tha tála! eatimBtefDrqijoallonablelransadions was betwen $100,000 and $500,000. In
JanuarySOOS, Coughlin pieaded gu lity ta fotony wlrafrard and taxevaslonchargesfor embezzllng cash, glft
cards and merchandee finom Walmart..

What rnakes the Coughlin tale so interesting is that The Wall Street Journal reporled that to the year frnmadíatety
prior lo hís "reaigndKon." Coughlin^ oompeneefon toteled more lhán $8 mllon.

RbWng e $5 milion ocmpensatícn package, ps wetl as the shama and related cDnsequetices.for e few hin*sd
ttiouBand dallart over a five-year pariad seema Irratlonal, Coughlto'8 bahavtor ateD Is Iroorabtant wlth the fraud
triangle model, devaloped in the mld-20th century, bacausa the motivaficn for this fraud did rol appear to ba
caused by a norcharable finandal pressure.

The ACFEs *2010 Repcrt ta the Nafions’ estimetes the cosi crf fnaud to be 5 peroent of businesses' annual
revenues. Globály, thls translales to ^jpnadmately $2.9 triRon oí ewwmia k»aes due to fnaud. to response,
antMraud efforts háve aitradedtheattfinlior cf a wtdagroupofprofesstonals: Intornal and extimal audltors,
membere of boande of dlrectorsand auditcommitlees, management and regulátore.
To ixidsretand why peepte commil fraud, many antl-fraud profeseicnals refer to the fraud triangle. Ite significance
In understandlng mrtlvedgn fs most evfdent ln Stfllement on Audltlng Standards (SAS) 99. "Conslderallon of
Freiid in a Financial 9talemant Audit," wtilch rnakes the concept centrál. Nevertridess, slnce the 19505,
prcrfessšonale and acadBmice háve ofíerod Importent ineights that háve gone beyond Ihe fraud trianele. These
extensions heve enhanoed professkjnals'ability loprevent, deter, deted, investígate and remajlale fraud.
R©*MUuh beyond Ihe fraud Irtangle—*umm»1ie<f In Figur© 1 tekw — can help to better uíxteratand thb
sedetal phariamenon.

http://www.fi‘aud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294970127&amp;Site=ACFEWEB                                                                       1.9.2014
Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                                                              Pagc 1 of8

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Share |  8+iifol                                                                                                                                                   Bring the
                                                                                                                                                                   facts into
Beyond the Fraud Triangle
                                                                                                                                                                             CLEAR ís designed to
Enhancing Deterrenceof Economic Crimes                                                                                                                                       address the needs oř
                                                                                                                                                                             fraud investigators.
JACK W. DORMINEY. PH.D A SCOTT FLEMING. PH.D . CPA. CMAMARY-JOKRANACHER. CFE. MBA.
CPA/CFF;RICHARD A RILEY JR., PH.D.. CFE. CPA/CFF                                                                                                                                                          I THOMSON REUTERS

September/Odober 2011                                                                                                                                    ACFE ——

  Fraud examiners háve ušed the fraud triangle as a standard method since the 1950s to understand fraudsters'                                          Bookstore
  motivations. However, the triangle is inadequate for deterring, preventing and detecting fraud because pressure
  and rationalization cannot be observed and do not adequately explain every occurrence of fraud. Here are some
  tools that go further.

  Adapted from "Beyond the Fraud Triangle." published in the July 2010 issue of The CPA Journal, copyright 2010,
  with permission from the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants (NYSSCPA).

                                                                                   In 1978, Walmart hired Thomas Coughlin as director
                                                                                   of loss prevention. Over the years, Coughlin worked
                                                                                   his way up in the organization to become vice
                                                                                   chairman. one of the most powerful positions in the
                                                                                   organization. But in March 2005. Walmarťs board of
                                                                                   directors forced Coughlin to resign amid allegations of
                                                                                   fraud and deceit.

                                                                                   In an April 8, 2005, article in The Wall Street Journal,
                                                                                   reporters James Bandler and Ann Zimmennan wrote
                                                                                   that "Mr. Coughlin periodically had subordinates
                                                                                   create fake invoices to get Walmart to pay for his
                                                                                   personál expenses. The questionable activity
                                                                                  appears to involve dozens of transactions over more
                                                                                  than five years. including hunting vacations, a $1,359
 pair of alligator boots custom made for Mr. Coughlin and a $2,590 dog pen for Mr. Coughlin's Arkansas home."

 Aocording to the article. the total estimate for questionable transactions was between $100,000 and $500.000. In
 January 2006, Coughlin pleaded guilty to felony wire fraud and tax evasion charges for embezzling cash. gift
 cards and merchandise from Walmart.

 What makes the Coughlin tale so interesting is that The Wall Street Journal reported that in the year immediately
 prior to his "resignation," Coughlirťs compensation totaled more than $6 million.

 Risking a S6 million compensation package, as well as the shame and related consequences, for a few hundred
 thousand dollars over a five-year period seems irrational. Coughlin's behavior also is inconsistent with the fraud
 triangle model, developed in the mid-20th century, because the motivation for this fraud did not appear to be
 caused by a nonsharable financial pressure.

 The ACFE’s "2010 Report to the Nations" estimates the cost of fraud to be 5 percent of businesses' annual
 revenues. Globally, this translates to approximately S2.9 trillion of economic losses due to fraud. In response,
 anti-fraud efforts háve attracted the attention of a wide group of professionals: internal and externa! auditors,
 members of boards of directors and audit committees, management and regulators.
 To understand why people commit fraud, many anti-fraud professionals refer to the fraud triangle. Its significance
 in understanding motivation is most evident in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 99, "Consideration of
 Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit." which makes the concept centrál. Nevertheless. since the 1950s,
 professionals and academics háve offered important insights that háve gone beyond the fraud triangle. These
 extensions háve enhanced professionals' ability to prevent. deter. detect. investigate and remediate fraud.
 Research beyond the fraud triangle — summarized in Figuře 1 below — can help to better understand this
 societaI phenomenon.

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Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                                                    Pagc 2 of 8

               Defiflitwn                       Shortcomintp                   Exktnion                       Beoefii of fxleraion

Tkfnwltagfe    Cons-org«KO of porcot*ad
               prossuro, porcoivod oppor
               lurtfy and raSonalzofton to      Froud trsanglo ts from lho     fraud dkxnond: Add an os-      Capabíty a generály a more
               focfcolefroud                    froudstor j porvpoťSvo. jo     vossmort of copabilíy (soo     obsorvablo oTtnbuto man
                                                two cftríutes (pressure and    lbe dHcussion of pressure ond  pressure or rohonalizáhon
                                                rationakzaBon) aro gcnerciy    raBonafczabon In lbe Sext!
                                                nonobsorvoblo.                                                Underslondtog predators
                                                                               Rocogrvzo dici prodators sool  bener preparos onh-froud
                                                Dow nor odoquoeofy captoin     only opporrwtty and onhonoe    profosstonek for doofing wttb
                                                lbe ocbofij d pahoJogcd        a comrntmcnl to profosstood    moro ddberale and neťariow
                                                froudstorv prodetort who aro   skepUásm. fcroinstormng and    fraudsters.
                                                boftor organizaci kovo botter  críjcol éiinking
                                                conceak-nortf schcmos ond are
                                                boner o! inleracSng wíh
                                                oudtofi and orti-froud
                                                profevswoaU

Attribute                                       flwceived pressure is on       Expand lbe sol of fraudsters'  MÍCE provtdos 0 brooder sol
Pwieivtd Pressure Nonshareable ftoancial rvocd  incompkdo deseripror of o      mc«ve*ons using MÍCE:          of fraud mofivoíons beyond
                                                fraudsters monvaBom            Money. Ideology, Coerdon and   nonshareable fmonod need
                                                                               Ego {ortHemenJl
                                                Dow nor odáross coBusfve
Perceived      Oppcrknity to cotnmí and         behavkx or manogeownl          Focus on an anti fraud         Undorstandtog codusive
Opportunity    conceal tfte fraud od.           overrida                       orMronment, sudí as culturo,   behaaors better prepares
                                                                               lano al lho top ond ongaged    onňfroud professtorvais for
                                                Nooob«<vťcWe                   corporate gorernaoce. in       the choSonges of menogemert
                                                                               odditton to vodftonot Mernal
                                                                               cortroh                        overnde. ccrrupeon and abuse.

Rotiononzotwn  Morahy defonsiblo                                               Fraud Sede: Substitytng        Moro vtsibie lhán rcftonalza-
               jusJtfscahon řor acnocs                                         frdegnry for rafionallzasioft  Bort by obsorvmg dccsions
               soomándy od of chořoclor                                                                       and dodston-mding procosses
               for fw troud porpelrotor                                                                       to ossess 0 perserú integrity

SEMINAL EFFORTS IN FRAUD RESEARCH

Much of the current understanding of why perpetrators commit fraud is grounded in the fraud tnangle. The
concept dates back to the work of Edwin Sutherland, who coined the term white-collar erime. and Donald
Cressey. who wrote "Other People's Money" (Patterson Smith, 1973). Cressey. a doctoral student of Sutherland
in the 1940s, concentrated his research on the circumstances that led fraudsters to initially violate ethical
slandards and engage in their first fraudulent aets. Over the years. his findings became known as the fraud
triangle, whose points represent the causal factors of perceived pressure (oř nonshareable financial need),
perceived opportunity and rationalization. (See Figuře 2 below.)

PERCEIVED ('NONSHAREABLE') FINANCIAL PRESSURES

As documented in "Other People's Money" when Cressey asked individuals who had violated a trust why they
had not exploited previous fraud opportunities, those who responded gave one or more of the following reasons:

      • "There was no need for it like there was this time."
      • "The idea never entered my head."
      • "I thought it v/as dishonest then, but this time it did not seem dishonest at first."

Furthermore, the fraudster had concluded that his financial problém could not be shared with other individuals
who might háve aided in solving the problém. Some nonshareable financial pressures include:

      • Sudden financial shortfalls.
      • Living beyond one's means.
      • Greed.
      • Poor credit standing and inability to obtain credit.
      • Unexpected significant medical expenditures.
      • Large education expenditures.
      • Family or peer pressure

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Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                               Pagc 3 of 8

      • Gambling losses.
      • Cost and lack of productivity due to drugs or aleohol.
      • Cost of extramarital affairs.

However, a fraud examiner generally cannot observe "pressure." This is particularty true for auditors who might
not recognize the symptoms associated with pressure because they often háve limited interactions with potential
perpetrators and lack a baseline from which to evaluate current behavior.

PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY

The second required attribute is opportunity. The employee must perceive a chance to commit the fraud without
being detected. This opportunity can arise from several sources, including:

      • Poor intemal Controls.
      • Poor training.
      • Poor supervision.
      • Lack of proseeution of perpetrators.
      • Ineffective anti-fraud programs. polides and procedures.
      • Weak ethical culture (e.g.. poor 'tone at the top").

Traditionally, opportunity has been examined solely within the context of poor internal Controls, especially with
respecl to the segregation of duties, which háve garnered close serutiny in recent years (e.g., in Sarbanes-Oxley,
Section 404 requirements). More recently, the other elements of opportunity háve also attracted attention from
the profession.

RATIONALIZATION

Cressey indicated that a morally acceptable rationalization is necessary before the erime takés plače. Because a
fraudster does not view himself as a eriminal, he must justify his misdeeds to himself before he ever commits
them. For example, the perpetrator might rationalize his actions by thinking, "This is just a loan, and 1*11 pay it
back after my next paycheck." The rationalization allows the perpetrator to view illegal behavior as acceptable,
thus preserving his self-image as a trustworthy person. Of course, the payback of that "loan" does not occur. Like
pressure. rationalization is not a readily observable characteristic because it is impossible to see what someone
might be thinking.

A RECIPE FOR FRAUD

A fundamental observation of the Cressey study is that it takés the presence of all three elements — pressure.
opportunity and rationalization — for the violation of trust to occur. The fraud triangle highlights what we witness
in society: An individual facing a nonshareable financial challenge with perceived opportunity and a morally
defensible excuse might commit fraud. Cressey’s fraud triangle is a strong explanatory model that identifies the
core elements that make a fraudulent act appear benign to the fraudster.

Sutherland and Cressey were able to help anti-fraud professionals understand the motivations and actions of
good people who make bad choices. Nevertheless, the triangle alone is an inadequate tool for deterring,
preventing and detecting fraud because two of the characterislics — pressure and rationalization — cannot be
observed. As a result, other fraud models háve been developed to provide alternativě views of the fraud act that
might aid when the fraud triangle has fallen shoří.

THE 'OTHER' FRAUD TRIANGLE

Because the originál fraud triangle lacks objective eriteria for identifying pressure and rationalization, many
experts refer to a second fraud triangle, consisting of the act, concealment and conversion. This triangle focuses
on proving that the act constilutes fraud by gathering evidence of the intent to deceive (i.e., concealment) and of
the victim's economic damages (i.e., conversion).

THE FRAUD SCALE

The fraud scale was introduced by Steve Albrecht, Keith Howe and Marshall Romney in "Deterring Fraud: The
Internal Auditoris Perspective" (Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, 1984). Albrecht and his
colleagues believed that fraud is difficult to predict because a reliable profile of occupational fraud perpetrators
does not exist. They suggested that the likelihood of a fraudulent act could be assessed by evaluating the
relative forces of pressure, opportunity and personál integrity. Pressure and opportunity are both components of
the fraud triangle, but the fraud scale substitutes personál integrity for rationalization.

The fraud scale is particularly applicable to financial statement fraud, in which sources of pressure (e.g., analysts'
forecasts. managemenťs earnings guidance and a history of sales and earnings growth) are more observable.
With that in mind, the fraud scale posits that when pressure, opportunity and integrity are considered at the same
time, one can determine whether a situation possesses a higher probability of fraud. (See Figuře 3 below.)

  Probability of Fraud  Higher               lower
   Observed Pressure     High                  low
                         High                  low
       Opportunity        low                 High
          Integrity
                                              low Pressure
High Pressure                         lesser Opportunity
Greater Opportunity             High Personál Integrity
low Personál Integrity          Conditions Suggesting
Conditions Suggesting
Higher Fraud Risk                      lower Fraud Risk

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Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                                Pagc 4 of 8

       The benefit of using personál integrity is that by observing both a person's decisions as well as the decision-
       making processes, his commilment to ethical decision making can be gauged. As noted by Zabihollah Rezaee
       and Richard A. Riley Jr. in "Financial Statement Fraud: Prevention and Detection" (Wiley, 2010), centrál to the
       idea of deterrence is the reliance on personál decision making and responsibility.

       Violations of ethics, trust and responsibility are at the heart of fraudulent activities. Ethics addresses the
       rationalization and, to a certain extent, the pressure associated with fraud by considering the conditions under
       which a potential fraudster might consider an action right or wrong. Professionals who consider the ethics of a
       decision might be able to assess integrity and thus the relative likelihood of an individual committing fraud.
       THE FRAUD DIAMOND: ADDING THE FRAUDSTER'S CAPABILIITIES

       In "The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud" (The CPA Journal, December 2004), David T.
       Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson present a four-sided fraud diamond that incorporates an individual's capability —
       personál traits and abilities that play a major role in whether fraud will actually occur given the presence of
       pressure. opportunity and rationalization. (See Figuře 4 below.)

                                FIGUŘE 4: The Froud Diamond

      Sovrco: David tWfelfoond Dana R. Harmonvon/nw Froud Dkimoná Coroidtring tam
      8*m«nfccffnwď The CM Journal De<«mfe» 2004.

The authors suggest that many frauds. especially some of the multibillion-dollar financial statement frauds, would
not háve occurred without the right person with the right capabilities implementing the details of the fraud.
Opportunity opens the dooř, and incentive and rationalization draw the potential fraudster toward the open
doorway, but the individual must háve the capability to walk through that opening. Accordingly, the critical
question is: Who could tum an opportunity for fraud into reality? Wolfe and Hermanson suggest four observable
traits for committing fraud, especially when it involves large sums of money or it continues for an extended period
of time:

      • Authoritative position or function within the organization.
      • Capacity to understand and exploit acoounting systems and internal control weaknesses, possibly

         leveraging responsibility and abusing authority to complete and conceal the fraud.
      • Confidence (ego) that she will not be detected, or, if caught, that she will talk herself out of trouble.
      • Capability to deal with the stress created within an otherwise good person when she commits bad aets.

Focusing on capability requires organizations and their auditors to observe, assess and document the
capabilities of top executives, key personnel and employees who can perpetrate and conceal fraud aets.

THE MÍCE MODEL

Another challenge for the fraud triangle is that it oversimplifies the motivation for every fraud act. Consider the
čase of Thomas M. Coughlin at the beginning of this article. The risks taken by Coughlin were similar to those
that other millionaire CEOs and CFOs took with financial statement fraud.

With financial reporting fraud. the first leg of the fraud triangle (perceived financial pressure) is modified to
consider alternativě motivators such as monetary incentives, bonuses or stock options. While top executives
dearly feel pressure to deliver solid financial results, such pressure is not the same as the nonshareable financial
pressure deseribed by Cressey.

To address this issue — presented in "Forensic Accounting and Fraud Examination," by Mary-Jo Kranacher,
Richard A. Riley Jr. and Joseph T. Wells, (Wiley. 2010) — Professor Jason Thomas suggests that the
motivations of fraud perpetrators might be more appropriately expanded and identified with the acronym MÍCE:
money, ideology, coercion and ego/entitlement.

Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Phar-Mor and 77.7.7. Best provide good examples in which the convicted
perpetrators appeared to be motivated by money. ego and entitlement. Less frequenUy, individuals might be
unwillingly pulled into a fraud scheme (i.e., coercion) In the Walmart čase, Patsy Stephens, a manager in the
organization, sued Coughlin and claimed that she was coerced into submitting vouchers and laundering the
money through her own bank account (Brian White, "Former Wal-Mart Manager Sues Tom Coughlin — for Her
Own Misdeeds."). Low-level or unwilling individuals can become whistleblowers, and they often provide
testimony against fraud ringleaders.

Ideology is most often associated with frauds like tax evasion and. more recently. terrorist financing. For
example, a tax evader might believe the govemment is not entitled to his money. and terrorists might feel
justified in committing fraud to finance their activities. Ideological motivators allow the end to justify the means;
perpetrators steal money or partidpate in fraud aets or financial erimes to achieve some perceived greater good
that is consistent with their beliefs.

While the MÍCE heuristic does not explain all fraudulent motivations, and some fit several categories, it is easily
remembered. In addition, it provides professionals with a broader framework within which to consider the

http://www.fraud-inagazine.com/article.aspx7icH4294970127&amn;Site=ACFEWEB                                               1.9.2014
Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                                     Pagc 5 of 8

       likelihood of fraud.

       THE 'PREDATOR' VERSUS THE 'ACCIDENTAL FRAUDSTER'

       The common fraudster is usually depicted as having these characteristics: first-time offender; middle-aged; well-
       educated; trusted employee; in a position of responsibility; and considered a good Citizen through Service works
       at the Office, in the community or at a charitable organization. This individual succumbs to pressure. develops
       one or more fraud schemes and commits some fraud act. In "Forensic Accounting and Fraud Examination,"
       Kranacher, Riley and Wells characterize this type of perpetrator as the "accidental fraudster." Notwithstanding
       the fraud act, the accidental fraudster is considered to be a good, law-abiding person, who under normál
       drcumstances would never consider breaking the law or harming others. The fraud triangle was created with the
       acadental fraudster in mind.

       What if an individual had committed fraud at a prior organization? Illegal aets tend to be followed by more illegal
       aets, and a continuum of illegal aets defines the pathological fraudster or "predator":

              • Predators seek out organizations where they can start to scheme almost immediately after being hired.
              • At some point, many acddental fraudsters, if not caught beforehand, will move from the behavior

                 characteristic of an accidental fraudster to that of a predator.
              • Financial statement fraud perpetrators often appear to start as accidental fraudsters, or even just as

                 earnings managers. and sooner or later become predators.

       Predators are far more deliberate and focused than accidental fraudsters; they are better organized, háve better
       concealment schemes, and are better prepared to deal with auditors and other oversight mechanisms. All the
       predator seeks is opportunity; he requires no pressure and needs no rationalization.

       Instead, arrogance and a eriminal mindset replace the originál fraud triangle's antecedents of pressure and
       rationalization. A new fraud diamond emerges (see Figuře 5 below) and helps to explain the motivators for both
       accidental fraudsters and predators. It is essential that anti-fraud research and literatuře recognize that predators
       exist and provide anti-fraud professionals with the critical tools they need to identity the distinguishing
       charactenstics and motivations for exposing the predatory fraudster

CONCERNS OF COLLUSIVE FRAUD AND MANAGEMENT OVERRIDE

Because the fraud triangle generally considers individuals acting alone. it does not provide a good basis for
assessing the likelihood of fraud under conditions of collusion. Yet this is one of the centrál elements of complex
frauds and financial erimes. Collusion might také plače among individuals within an organization or across
organizations. According to the ACFE's 2010 "Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse." when
collusion is involved. the sizes of fraud losses inerease dramatically, from $100,000 to $366,000 per incident.
The losses caused by individual predators can be substantial, but when those individuals work in concert with
others, the damage can be devastating and far more pervasive.

In cases of collusion, internal Controls centered on segregation of duties are generally ineffective in preventing
fraud and other financial erimes. Although internal Controls cannot prevent collusive fraud aets, they can assist in
the detection of such activities. For example, independent monitoring might reveal that internal Controls háve
been circumvented through collusion. Management override is not inherently collusive, but most involve
collusion.

Proactive fraud detection includes a search for collusion and management override. Fraud from management
override can be very difficult to detect. Ultimately, the board of directors and the audit committee háve an
obligation and responsibility to shareholders to police management. The AICPA guide, "Management Overnde of
Internal Controls; The Achilles' Heel of Fraud Prevention — The Audit Committee and Oversight of Financial
Reporting," identifies six key actions that the audit committee should consider in performing these duties:

      • Maintain skepticism.
      • Strengthen committee understanding of the business.
      • Brainstorm to identify fraud risks.
      • Use the code of conduct to assess the financial reporting culture.
      • Ensure the entity cultivates a vigorous whistleblower program.
      • Develop a broad information and feedback network.

In the article, "Preventing and Detecting Collusive Management Fraud" (The CPA Journal, October 2008),
Stephen E. Silver, Arron Scott Fleming and Richard A. Riley Jr.. suggest that, beyond the review of
managemenťs fraud risk assessment, an audit committee should consider the following questions:

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Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                              Pagc 6 of 8

         Do the internal auditors and the audit committee háve the knowledge, education and awareness of the
         various fraudulent management override and collusive schemes that management might perpetrate?
         Has the audit committee reviewed a comprehensive fraud risk assessment, including how collusive fraud
         and management override schemes are mitigated and detected?
         Háve audit committee members partidpated in continuing education programs that can prepare them for
         appraising managemenťs fraud risk assessment?
         Did the audit committee assist in the collusive and management override fraud risk assessment process,
         or did it rely solely on the internal or extemal audit group?
         Does the audit committee háve direct oversight of the internal audit (as required by the New York Stock
         Exchange). or do the internal auditors report to management?

A proactive approach by the audit committee reinforces the tone at the top. sends a positive signál to all levels of
management and aets as a fraud deterrent. The perception of available collusive fraud opportunities and the
likelihood of being detected in such a proactive environment might. in fact, reduce the occurrence of most costly
frauds within an organization. One can use this knowledge of collusive frauds and management override to
evaluate different environments for the likelihood of fraud aets that would be undetected by traditional corporate
governance mechamsms. To further assist professionals, Figuře 6 (below) presents the impact of predators,
collusion and override in contrast to the lone fraud perpetrator.

FIGUŘE 6: Fraud Assessment Tools by Fraudster type

Anti-fraud                  Accidental  Predator                             Collusion
Assessments                 Fraudster                                     (Mgt. Override)
The Fraud Triangle
                            Effectivo   Not Effective                     Not Effective
  Perceived Pressure        Effective      Effective                         Effective
  Perceived Opportunity     Effective
  Rationalization           Effective   N.. o.t. E.f..f.e. c..t.i.v..e..  Not Effective
The Fraud Scale: Integrity                 Effoctive                         Effoctive
The Fraud Diamond:
Capability                  Effectivo   Effective                         Effective

MICí                        Effective   Effective                         Effective
Professianol Skepticism     Effective   Effective                         Effective
                            Effective   Effective                         Effective
Brainstorming               Effective   Effective                         Effective
Critical Thinking

A BASIS FOR FRAUD DETERRENCE

Fraud deterrence refers to creating an environment in which people are discouraged from committing fraud,
although it is still possible. Because opportunity involves both access to commit the fraud and the perception that
the fraudster can get away with it. one aspect of deterrence is the fear of getting caught. In "Theft by
Employees" (Simon & Schuster, 1983), Richard C. Hollinger and John P. Clark found that the perceived certainty
of detection is inversely related to employee theft — that is. the more likely employees think they will be caught.
the less likely it is that an employee will steal.

The second aspect of deterrence is fear of punishment. The "2005 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual"
defines deterrence as a clear message sent to society that repeated eriminal behavior will inerease the severity
of punishment with each recurrence.

In addition. Sutherland suggests that employees. particularly those in senior positions, set the ethical tone for the
entire organization When leaders model questionable. unethical or fraudulent behavior, normally honest
employees are more likely to rationalize fraud. Sutherlanďs theory holds the converse to be true.

Deterrence is usually accomplished through a variety of efforts associated with internal Controls and anti-fraud
programs that create a workplace of integrity and encourage employees to report potential wrongdoing. Fraud
deterrence can also be achieved through the use of continuous monitoring and auditing software tools.

Anti-fraud techniques and Controls include:

• An ethical tone at the top.
• A meaningful code of conduct.
• Open Communications with employees. vendors. suppliers and customers.
• Employee activity monitoring.
• Hotlines.
• Whistieblower protection.
• A protocol for punishing perpetrators.
• The monitoring of contractual parties.
• Proactive fraud auditing.

These items are inctuded as part of a checklist shown in Figuře 7 below. The deterrence fabric includes all
corporate governance professionals. including the board of directors. audit committee. top management and
extemal and internal auditors.

http://www.fraud-inagazine.corn/article.aspx7icH4294970127&amn;Site=ACFEWEB                                            1.9.2014
Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                          Pagc 7 of 8

Anti-fraud Controls to inerease fear of getting cought

Proper Controls design                                       □

Controls operationol as designed                             □

Continuous monitoring                                        □

Auditing software tools                                      □

Punishment protocol                                          □

Open Communications with employees, vendors, suppliers ond customers □

Proper employee octivity monitoring                          □

Effective tip hotfmes                                        □

Whistleblower protections                                    □

Monitoring of conlractual parties                            □

Anti-fraud environment to deflate possible rationalizations

Proper tone at the top                                       3

Strong, ethical corporate culture                            □

Workploce of integrity                                       □

Meaningful code of conduct                                   3

Anti-fraud training programs                                 □

The notion of deterrence tends to address two aspects of the fraud triangle: opportunity and rationalization.
When Controls and anti-fraud programs are introduced as deterrents, the fraudster perceives that the opportunity
to commit and conceal fraud has been reduced or eliminated.

The fraudster's rationalization may be deterred or reduced through training programs and a strong corporate
culture that command a high ethical standard. Deterrence efforts are observable and can be ušed to assess the
likelihood of fraud. The Figuře 7 checklist is a way to assess anti-fraud efforts aimed at addressing opportunity
and rationalization.

Understanding who commits fraud —and how and why it is committed — will enhance a professionafs ability to
prevent, deter, detect and investigate fraud.

Jack W. Dorminey. Ph.D., and A. Scott Fleming, Ph D., CPA. CMA. are assistant professors of accounting at
West Virginia University. Morgantown.
W.V.

Mary-Jo Kranacher, MBA, CFE, CPA/CFF, is the ACFE endowed professor of fraud examination at York
College of the City University of New York (CUNY), Jamaica. N.Y.; editor-in-chief of The CPA Journal and
president of the Institute for Fraud Prevention.

Richard A. Riley, Jr.. Ph.D., CFE. CPA/CFF, is a Louis F. Tanner Distinguished Professor of Public Accounting,
also at West Virginia University. He is chairof the ACFE Higher Education Advisory Committee, vice president of
operations and research for the Institute for Fraud Prevention and editor of the Fraud EDge column in Fraud
Magazíne.

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners assumes sole copyright of any article published on www.fraud-
magazine.com or www.ACFE.com. ACFE follows a policy of exclusive publication. Permission of the publisher is
required before an article can be copied or reproduced. Requests for reprinting an article in any form must be
emailed to FraudMagazine@ACFE.com.

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http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx7icH4294970127&amn;Site=ACFEWEB                                          1.9.2014
Beyond the Fraud Triangle                                                                                            Pagc 8 of 8

Reviews

By Richard_Riley

By Colleen_67
Excellent article! Finally addresses the chronic perpetrators! I use this in my presentations!

irtoirirtk

By Mohammad
Simply great. It was important to add the fact that the one who is capable of talking his or her way out very
confidently - is a red flag! in addition to the fraud triangle elements. I would like to thank the contributors.

By Birzeit Consulting ME
This is one of the best well-written articles about this subject. I would like to thank all who contributed to this
article as it is an addition to the experts' arsenal in fighting fraud and corruption.

ůitíttirk

By p47koji
Good stuff!

wwirinr «L fy
         iL A,,

By Kriz

Great article

ikitfakú

By Angel
Great updated information.

By Kimberly_2

By Chartes_73
very informative piece

ir**itr*

By Richard_64
This is a leap forward in the research on "why people commit fraud" I will quote this article in the graduate
course I teach at UW Milwaukee on Fraud Examination.

By Jonathan_14
Marks has been saying this for years. This article is further proof of his theory. http://bit.ly/fraudpentagon

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http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx7icH4294970127&amp;Site=ACFEWEB                                            .9.2014