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Beyond the Fraud Triangle
Enhancing Deterrence of Economic Crimes
MCK W. DORMINEY, PH. D- ;A SCOTT FLEMING. PH.T, CPA. CMA.-MARY-JD KRANACHF R. CFF.. MBA,
CPA/CFFiRICHAROA. KILtYJK., FH.O.rUhb.CPA/CFh
S*ptomb«rfOctotor 2011
Fraud avamtaare háve ušed the faudtríangie as a standard method stnce the 1950s to undecstsrd fraudsters' Acn
mofoatíons. However, tho tfiangte ismadequate for doterring, ^evanftog and detocting fatxl ůecaus© pre$$ire
andrationalization oennot be observod and do not aclequatety expfaín evay ocajrrencd offreud. Horo aro sune Boókslore
toofa that go further.
Adapter! front "Beyond the Rand Triangle, "publi&hed In ttreJufy 201ú íbsug ofThe CPA Jotmal, copyright 3010,
wth permisshn frvm the New York State Setiety ofCestifled PuMtc Arjcotu)lůnti< (NYSSCPA).
.— tn 1976. Walmart hlrad Thomas Coughlin as dlredor
of lo$s prevemion. Ověř the years. Coughlíri worked
his wey up řn the orgarozetion to became vioe
chAmsn, one of the most powerfii pceitions In the
cfgariiation. But in lubníi 2005, Walmart1s hoard of
dirsctore forced Coughlin to resign amid alegafione of
fraud ari daceit.
to an Apríl 6, 2005, artlde In The Wall Slreot Journal,
reportéra James Band Iar and Ann ammermar wrate
lhal "Mr, Coughlin periodfcally had subordinates
creetefeke Invoicea to get Walmart to payforhb
p$f5cnpl expense* The quESťanabie Bctívtty
appeara to invotvo dozers of transactions over more
than Rva years, indudíng huniing vaoallons, a $1,359
palrof aligátor bočte ciistcm rode fbr Mr. Coughlin and a $2.530 dog pen tor Mr. Coughlns Arkanses herně."
Accwťlrig to the adici e.tha tála! eatimBtefDrqijoallonablelransadions was betwen $100,000 and $500,000. In
JanuarySOOS, Coughlin pieaded gu lity ta fotony wlrafrard and taxevaslonchargesfor embezzllng cash, glft
cards and merchandee finom Walmart..
What rnakes the Coughlin tale so interesting is that The Wall Street Journal reporled that to the year frnmadíatety
prior lo hís "reaigndKon." Coughlin^ oompeneefon toteled more lhán $8 mllon.
RbWng e $5 milion ocmpensatícn package, ps wetl as the shama and related cDnsequetices.for e few hin*sd
ttiouBand dallart over a five-year pariad seema Irratlonal, Coughlto'8 bahavtor ateD Is Iroorabtant wlth the fraud
triangle model, devaloped in the mld-20th century, bacausa the motivaficn for this fraud did rol appear to ba
caused by a norcharable finandal pressure.
The ACFEs *2010 Repcrt ta the Nafions’ estimetes the cosi crf fnaud to be 5 peroent of businesses' annual
revenues. Globály, thls translales to ^jpnadmately $2.9 triRon oí ewwmia k»aes due to fnaud. to response,
antMraud efforts háve aitradedtheattfinlior cf a wtdagroupofprofesstonals: Intornal and extimal audltors,
membere of boande of dlrectorsand auditcommitlees, management and regulátore.
To ixidsretand why peepte commil fraud, many antl-fraud profeseicnals refer to the fraud triangle. Ite significance
In understandlng mrtlvedgn fs most evfdent ln Stfllement on Audltlng Standards (SAS) 99. "Conslderallon of
Freiid in a Financial 9talemant Audit," wtilch rnakes the concept centrál. Nevertridess, slnce the 19505,
prcrfessšonale and acadBmice háve ofíerod Importent ineights that háve gone beyond Ihe fraud trianele. These
extensions heve enhanoed professkjnals'ability loprevent, deter, deted, investígate and remajlale fraud.
R©*MUuh beyond Ihe fraud Irtangle—*umm»1ie<f In Figur© 1 tekw — can help to better uíxteratand thb
sedetal phariamenon.
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 1 of8
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Share | 8+iifol Bring the
facts into
Beyond the Fraud Triangle
CLEAR ís designed to
Enhancing Deterrenceof Economic Crimes address the needs oř
fraud investigators.
JACK W. DORMINEY. PH.D A SCOTT FLEMING. PH.D . CPA. CMAMARY-JOKRANACHER. CFE. MBA.
CPA/CFF;RICHARD A RILEY JR., PH.D.. CFE. CPA/CFF I THOMSON REUTERS
September/Odober 2011 ACFE ——
Fraud examiners háve ušed the fraud triangle as a standard method since the 1950s to understand fraudsters' Bookstore
motivations. However, the triangle is inadequate for deterring, preventing and detecting fraud because pressure
and rationalization cannot be observed and do not adequately explain every occurrence of fraud. Here are some
tools that go further.
Adapted from "Beyond the Fraud Triangle." published in the July 2010 issue of The CPA Journal, copyright 2010,
with permission from the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants (NYSSCPA).
In 1978, Walmart hired Thomas Coughlin as director
of loss prevention. Over the years, Coughlin worked
his way up in the organization to become vice
chairman. one of the most powerful positions in the
organization. But in March 2005. Walmarťs board of
directors forced Coughlin to resign amid allegations of
fraud and deceit.
In an April 8, 2005, article in The Wall Street Journal,
reporters James Bandler and Ann Zimmennan wrote
that "Mr. Coughlin periodically had subordinates
create fake invoices to get Walmart to pay for his
personál expenses. The questionable activity
appears to involve dozens of transactions over more
than five years. including hunting vacations, a $1,359
pair of alligator boots custom made for Mr. Coughlin and a $2,590 dog pen for Mr. Coughlin's Arkansas home."
Aocording to the article. the total estimate for questionable transactions was between $100,000 and $500.000. In
January 2006, Coughlin pleaded guilty to felony wire fraud and tax evasion charges for embezzling cash. gift
cards and merchandise from Walmart.
What makes the Coughlin tale so interesting is that The Wall Street Journal reported that in the year immediately
prior to his "resignation," Coughlirťs compensation totaled more than $6 million.
Risking a S6 million compensation package, as well as the shame and related consequences, for a few hundred
thousand dollars over a five-year period seems irrational. Coughlin's behavior also is inconsistent with the fraud
triangle model, developed in the mid-20th century, because the motivation for this fraud did not appear to be
caused by a nonsharable financial pressure.
The ACFE’s "2010 Report to the Nations" estimates the cost of fraud to be 5 percent of businesses' annual
revenues. Globally, this translates to approximately S2.9 trillion of economic losses due to fraud. In response,
anti-fraud efforts háve attracted the attention of a wide group of professionals: internal and externa! auditors,
members of boards of directors and audit committees, management and regulators.
To understand why people commit fraud, many anti-fraud professionals refer to the fraud triangle. Its significance
in understanding motivation is most evident in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 99, "Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit." which makes the concept centrál. Nevertheless. since the 1950s,
professionals and academics háve offered important insights that háve gone beyond the fraud triangle. These
extensions háve enhanced professionals' ability to prevent. deter. detect. investigate and remediate fraud.
Research beyond the fraud triangle — summarized in Figuře 1 below — can help to better understand this
societaI phenomenon.
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 2 of 8
Defiflitwn Shortcomintp Exktnion Beoefii of fxleraion
Tkfnwltagfe Cons-org«KO of porcot*ad
prossuro, porcoivod oppor
lurtfy and raSonalzofton to Froud trsanglo ts from lho fraud dkxnond: Add an os- Capabíty a generály a more
focfcolefroud froudstor j porvpoťSvo. jo vossmort of copabilíy (soo obsorvablo oTtnbuto man
two cftríutes (pressure and lbe dHcussion of pressure ond pressure or rohonalizáhon
rationakzaBon) aro gcnerciy raBonafczabon In lbe Sext!
nonobsorvoblo. Underslondtog predators
Rocogrvzo dici prodators sool bener preparos onh-froud
Dow nor odoquoeofy captoin only opporrwtty and onhonoe profosstonek for doofing wttb
lbe ocbofij d pahoJogcd a comrntmcnl to profosstood moro ddberale and neťariow
froudstorv prodetort who aro skepUásm. fcroinstormng and fraudsters.
boftor organizaci kovo botter críjcol éiinking
conceak-nortf schcmos ond are
boner o! inleracSng wíh
oudtofi and orti-froud
profevswoaU
Attribute flwceived pressure is on Expand lbe sol of fraudsters' MÍCE provtdos 0 brooder sol
Pwieivtd Pressure Nonshareable ftoancial rvocd incompkdo deseripror of o mc«ve*ons using MÍCE: of fraud mofivoíons beyond
fraudsters monvaBom Money. Ideology, Coerdon and nonshareable fmonod need
Ego {ortHemenJl
Dow nor odáross coBusfve
Perceived Oppcrknity to cotnmí and behavkx or manogeownl Focus on an anti fraud Undorstandtog codusive
Opportunity conceal tfte fraud od. overrida orMronment, sudí as culturo, behaaors better prepares
lano al lho top ond ongaged onňfroud professtorvais for
Nooob«<vťcWe corporate gorernaoce. in the choSonges of menogemert
odditton to vodftonot Mernal
cortroh overnde. ccrrupeon and abuse.
Rotiononzotwn Morahy defonsiblo Fraud Sede: Substitytng Moro vtsibie lhán rcftonalza-
jusJtfscahon řor acnocs frdegnry for rafionallzasioft Bort by obsorvmg dccsions
soomándy od of chořoclor and dodston-mding procosses
for fw troud porpelrotor to ossess 0 perserú integrity
SEMINAL EFFORTS IN FRAUD RESEARCH
Much of the current understanding of why perpetrators commit fraud is grounded in the fraud tnangle. The
concept dates back to the work of Edwin Sutherland, who coined the term white-collar erime. and Donald
Cressey. who wrote "Other People's Money" (Patterson Smith, 1973). Cressey. a doctoral student of Sutherland
in the 1940s, concentrated his research on the circumstances that led fraudsters to initially violate ethical
slandards and engage in their first fraudulent aets. Over the years. his findings became known as the fraud
triangle, whose points represent the causal factors of perceived pressure (oř nonshareable financial need),
perceived opportunity and rationalization. (See Figuře 2 below.)
PERCEIVED ('NONSHAREABLE') FINANCIAL PRESSURES
As documented in "Other People's Money" when Cressey asked individuals who had violated a trust why they
had not exploited previous fraud opportunities, those who responded gave one or more of the following reasons:
• "There was no need for it like there was this time."
• "The idea never entered my head."
• "I thought it v/as dishonest then, but this time it did not seem dishonest at first."
Furthermore, the fraudster had concluded that his financial problém could not be shared with other individuals
who might háve aided in solving the problém. Some nonshareable financial pressures include:
• Sudden financial shortfalls.
• Living beyond one's means.
• Greed.
• Poor credit standing and inability to obtain credit.
• Unexpected significant medical expenditures.
• Large education expenditures.
• Family or peer pressure
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 3 of 8
• Gambling losses.
• Cost and lack of productivity due to drugs or aleohol.
• Cost of extramarital affairs.
However, a fraud examiner generally cannot observe "pressure." This is particularty true for auditors who might
not recognize the symptoms associated with pressure because they often háve limited interactions with potential
perpetrators and lack a baseline from which to evaluate current behavior.
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY
The second required attribute is opportunity. The employee must perceive a chance to commit the fraud without
being detected. This opportunity can arise from several sources, including:
• Poor intemal Controls.
• Poor training.
• Poor supervision.
• Lack of proseeution of perpetrators.
• Ineffective anti-fraud programs. polides and procedures.
• Weak ethical culture (e.g.. poor 'tone at the top").
Traditionally, opportunity has been examined solely within the context of poor internal Controls, especially with
respecl to the segregation of duties, which háve garnered close serutiny in recent years (e.g., in Sarbanes-Oxley,
Section 404 requirements). More recently, the other elements of opportunity háve also attracted attention from
the profession.
RATIONALIZATION
Cressey indicated that a morally acceptable rationalization is necessary before the erime takés plače. Because a
fraudster does not view himself as a eriminal, he must justify his misdeeds to himself before he ever commits
them. For example, the perpetrator might rationalize his actions by thinking, "This is just a loan, and 1*11 pay it
back after my next paycheck." The rationalization allows the perpetrator to view illegal behavior as acceptable,
thus preserving his self-image as a trustworthy person. Of course, the payback of that "loan" does not occur. Like
pressure. rationalization is not a readily observable characteristic because it is impossible to see what someone
might be thinking.
A RECIPE FOR FRAUD
A fundamental observation of the Cressey study is that it takés the presence of all three elements — pressure.
opportunity and rationalization — for the violation of trust to occur. The fraud triangle highlights what we witness
in society: An individual facing a nonshareable financial challenge with perceived opportunity and a morally
defensible excuse might commit fraud. Cressey’s fraud triangle is a strong explanatory model that identifies the
core elements that make a fraudulent act appear benign to the fraudster.
Sutherland and Cressey were able to help anti-fraud professionals understand the motivations and actions of
good people who make bad choices. Nevertheless, the triangle alone is an inadequate tool for deterring,
preventing and detecting fraud because two of the characterislics — pressure and rationalization — cannot be
observed. As a result, other fraud models háve been developed to provide alternativě views of the fraud act that
might aid when the fraud triangle has fallen shoří.
THE 'OTHER' FRAUD TRIANGLE
Because the originál fraud triangle lacks objective eriteria for identifying pressure and rationalization, many
experts refer to a second fraud triangle, consisting of the act, concealment and conversion. This triangle focuses
on proving that the act constilutes fraud by gathering evidence of the intent to deceive (i.e., concealment) and of
the victim's economic damages (i.e., conversion).
THE FRAUD SCALE
The fraud scale was introduced by Steve Albrecht, Keith Howe and Marshall Romney in "Deterring Fraud: The
Internal Auditoris Perspective" (Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, 1984). Albrecht and his
colleagues believed that fraud is difficult to predict because a reliable profile of occupational fraud perpetrators
does not exist. They suggested that the likelihood of a fraudulent act could be assessed by evaluating the
relative forces of pressure, opportunity and personál integrity. Pressure and opportunity are both components of
the fraud triangle, but the fraud scale substitutes personál integrity for rationalization.
The fraud scale is particularly applicable to financial statement fraud, in which sources of pressure (e.g., analysts'
forecasts. managemenťs earnings guidance and a history of sales and earnings growth) are more observable.
With that in mind, the fraud scale posits that when pressure, opportunity and integrity are considered at the same
time, one can determine whether a situation possesses a higher probability of fraud. (See Figuře 3 below.)
Probability of Fraud Higher lower
Observed Pressure High low
High low
Opportunity low High
Integrity
low Pressure
High Pressure lesser Opportunity
Greater Opportunity High Personál Integrity
low Personál Integrity Conditions Suggesting
Conditions Suggesting
Higher Fraud Risk lower Fraud Risk
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 4 of 8
The benefit of using personál integrity is that by observing both a person's decisions as well as the decision-
making processes, his commilment to ethical decision making can be gauged. As noted by Zabihollah Rezaee
and Richard A. Riley Jr. in "Financial Statement Fraud: Prevention and Detection" (Wiley, 2010), centrál to the
idea of deterrence is the reliance on personál decision making and responsibility.
Violations of ethics, trust and responsibility are at the heart of fraudulent activities. Ethics addresses the
rationalization and, to a certain extent, the pressure associated with fraud by considering the conditions under
which a potential fraudster might consider an action right or wrong. Professionals who consider the ethics of a
decision might be able to assess integrity and thus the relative likelihood of an individual committing fraud.
THE FRAUD DIAMOND: ADDING THE FRAUDSTER'S CAPABILIITIES
In "The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud" (The CPA Journal, December 2004), David T.
Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson present a four-sided fraud diamond that incorporates an individual's capability —
personál traits and abilities that play a major role in whether fraud will actually occur given the presence of
pressure. opportunity and rationalization. (See Figuře 4 below.)
FIGUŘE 4: The Froud Diamond
Sovrco: David tWfelfoond Dana R. Harmonvon/nw Froud Dkimoná Coroidtring tam
8*m«nfccffnwď The CM Journal De<«mfe» 2004.
The authors suggest that many frauds. especially some of the multibillion-dollar financial statement frauds, would
not háve occurred without the right person with the right capabilities implementing the details of the fraud.
Opportunity opens the dooř, and incentive and rationalization draw the potential fraudster toward the open
doorway, but the individual must háve the capability to walk through that opening. Accordingly, the critical
question is: Who could tum an opportunity for fraud into reality? Wolfe and Hermanson suggest four observable
traits for committing fraud, especially when it involves large sums of money or it continues for an extended period
of time:
• Authoritative position or function within the organization.
• Capacity to understand and exploit acoounting systems and internal control weaknesses, possibly
leveraging responsibility and abusing authority to complete and conceal the fraud.
• Confidence (ego) that she will not be detected, or, if caught, that she will talk herself out of trouble.
• Capability to deal with the stress created within an otherwise good person when she commits bad aets.
Focusing on capability requires organizations and their auditors to observe, assess and document the
capabilities of top executives, key personnel and employees who can perpetrate and conceal fraud aets.
THE MÍCE MODEL
Another challenge for the fraud triangle is that it oversimplifies the motivation for every fraud act. Consider the
čase of Thomas M. Coughlin at the beginning of this article. The risks taken by Coughlin were similar to those
that other millionaire CEOs and CFOs took with financial statement fraud.
With financial reporting fraud. the first leg of the fraud triangle (perceived financial pressure) is modified to
consider alternativě motivators such as monetary incentives, bonuses or stock options. While top executives
dearly feel pressure to deliver solid financial results, such pressure is not the same as the nonshareable financial
pressure deseribed by Cressey.
To address this issue — presented in "Forensic Accounting and Fraud Examination," by Mary-Jo Kranacher,
Richard A. Riley Jr. and Joseph T. Wells, (Wiley. 2010) — Professor Jason Thomas suggests that the
motivations of fraud perpetrators might be more appropriately expanded and identified with the acronym MÍCE:
money, ideology, coercion and ego/entitlement.
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Phar-Mor and 77.7.7. Best provide good examples in which the convicted
perpetrators appeared to be motivated by money. ego and entitlement. Less frequenUy, individuals might be
unwillingly pulled into a fraud scheme (i.e., coercion) In the Walmart čase, Patsy Stephens, a manager in the
organization, sued Coughlin and claimed that she was coerced into submitting vouchers and laundering the
money through her own bank account (Brian White, "Former Wal-Mart Manager Sues Tom Coughlin — for Her
Own Misdeeds."). Low-level or unwilling individuals can become whistleblowers, and they often provide
testimony against fraud ringleaders.
Ideology is most often associated with frauds like tax evasion and. more recently. terrorist financing. For
example, a tax evader might believe the govemment is not entitled to his money. and terrorists might feel
justified in committing fraud to finance their activities. Ideological motivators allow the end to justify the means;
perpetrators steal money or partidpate in fraud aets or financial erimes to achieve some perceived greater good
that is consistent with their beliefs.
While the MÍCE heuristic does not explain all fraudulent motivations, and some fit several categories, it is easily
remembered. In addition, it provides professionals with a broader framework within which to consider the
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 5 of 8
likelihood of fraud.
THE 'PREDATOR' VERSUS THE 'ACCIDENTAL FRAUDSTER'
The common fraudster is usually depicted as having these characteristics: first-time offender; middle-aged; well-
educated; trusted employee; in a position of responsibility; and considered a good Citizen through Service works
at the Office, in the community or at a charitable organization. This individual succumbs to pressure. develops
one or more fraud schemes and commits some fraud act. In "Forensic Accounting and Fraud Examination,"
Kranacher, Riley and Wells characterize this type of perpetrator as the "accidental fraudster." Notwithstanding
the fraud act, the accidental fraudster is considered to be a good, law-abiding person, who under normál
drcumstances would never consider breaking the law or harming others. The fraud triangle was created with the
acadental fraudster in mind.
What if an individual had committed fraud at a prior organization? Illegal aets tend to be followed by more illegal
aets, and a continuum of illegal aets defines the pathological fraudster or "predator":
• Predators seek out organizations where they can start to scheme almost immediately after being hired.
• At some point, many acddental fraudsters, if not caught beforehand, will move from the behavior
characteristic of an accidental fraudster to that of a predator.
• Financial statement fraud perpetrators often appear to start as accidental fraudsters, or even just as
earnings managers. and sooner or later become predators.
Predators are far more deliberate and focused than accidental fraudsters; they are better organized, háve better
concealment schemes, and are better prepared to deal with auditors and other oversight mechanisms. All the
predator seeks is opportunity; he requires no pressure and needs no rationalization.
Instead, arrogance and a eriminal mindset replace the originál fraud triangle's antecedents of pressure and
rationalization. A new fraud diamond emerges (see Figuře 5 below) and helps to explain the motivators for both
accidental fraudsters and predators. It is essential that anti-fraud research and literatuře recognize that predators
exist and provide anti-fraud professionals with the critical tools they need to identity the distinguishing
charactenstics and motivations for exposing the predatory fraudster
CONCERNS OF COLLUSIVE FRAUD AND MANAGEMENT OVERRIDE
Because the fraud triangle generally considers individuals acting alone. it does not provide a good basis for
assessing the likelihood of fraud under conditions of collusion. Yet this is one of the centrál elements of complex
frauds and financial erimes. Collusion might také plače among individuals within an organization or across
organizations. According to the ACFE's 2010 "Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse." when
collusion is involved. the sizes of fraud losses inerease dramatically, from $100,000 to $366,000 per incident.
The losses caused by individual predators can be substantial, but when those individuals work in concert with
others, the damage can be devastating and far more pervasive.
In cases of collusion, internal Controls centered on segregation of duties are generally ineffective in preventing
fraud and other financial erimes. Although internal Controls cannot prevent collusive fraud aets, they can assist in
the detection of such activities. For example, independent monitoring might reveal that internal Controls háve
been circumvented through collusion. Management override is not inherently collusive, but most involve
collusion.
Proactive fraud detection includes a search for collusion and management override. Fraud from management
override can be very difficult to detect. Ultimately, the board of directors and the audit committee háve an
obligation and responsibility to shareholders to police management. The AICPA guide, "Management Overnde of
Internal Controls; The Achilles' Heel of Fraud Prevention — The Audit Committee and Oversight of Financial
Reporting," identifies six key actions that the audit committee should consider in performing these duties:
• Maintain skepticism.
• Strengthen committee understanding of the business.
• Brainstorm to identify fraud risks.
• Use the code of conduct to assess the financial reporting culture.
• Ensure the entity cultivates a vigorous whistleblower program.
• Develop a broad information and feedback network.
In the article, "Preventing and Detecting Collusive Management Fraud" (The CPA Journal, October 2008),
Stephen E. Silver, Arron Scott Fleming and Richard A. Riley Jr.. suggest that, beyond the review of
managemenťs fraud risk assessment, an audit committee should consider the following questions:
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 6 of 8
Do the internal auditors and the audit committee háve the knowledge, education and awareness of the
various fraudulent management override and collusive schemes that management might perpetrate?
Has the audit committee reviewed a comprehensive fraud risk assessment, including how collusive fraud
and management override schemes are mitigated and detected?
Háve audit committee members partidpated in continuing education programs that can prepare them for
appraising managemenťs fraud risk assessment?
Did the audit committee assist in the collusive and management override fraud risk assessment process,
or did it rely solely on the internal or extemal audit group?
Does the audit committee háve direct oversight of the internal audit (as required by the New York Stock
Exchange). or do the internal auditors report to management?
A proactive approach by the audit committee reinforces the tone at the top. sends a positive signál to all levels of
management and aets as a fraud deterrent. The perception of available collusive fraud opportunities and the
likelihood of being detected in such a proactive environment might. in fact, reduce the occurrence of most costly
frauds within an organization. One can use this knowledge of collusive frauds and management override to
evaluate different environments for the likelihood of fraud aets that would be undetected by traditional corporate
governance mechamsms. To further assist professionals, Figuře 6 (below) presents the impact of predators,
collusion and override in contrast to the lone fraud perpetrator.
FIGUŘE 6: Fraud Assessment Tools by Fraudster type
Anti-fraud Accidental Predator Collusion
Assessments Fraudster (Mgt. Override)
The Fraud Triangle
Effectivo Not Effective Not Effective
Perceived Pressure Effective Effective Effective
Perceived Opportunity Effective
Rationalization Effective N.. o.t. E.f..f.e. c..t.i.v..e.. Not Effective
The Fraud Scale: Integrity Effoctive Effoctive
The Fraud Diamond:
Capability Effectivo Effective Effective
MICí Effective Effective Effective
Professianol Skepticism Effective Effective Effective
Effective Effective Effective
Brainstorming Effective Effective Effective
Critical Thinking
A BASIS FOR FRAUD DETERRENCE
Fraud deterrence refers to creating an environment in which people are discouraged from committing fraud,
although it is still possible. Because opportunity involves both access to commit the fraud and the perception that
the fraudster can get away with it. one aspect of deterrence is the fear of getting caught. In "Theft by
Employees" (Simon & Schuster, 1983), Richard C. Hollinger and John P. Clark found that the perceived certainty
of detection is inversely related to employee theft — that is. the more likely employees think they will be caught.
the less likely it is that an employee will steal.
The second aspect of deterrence is fear of punishment. The "2005 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual"
defines deterrence as a clear message sent to society that repeated eriminal behavior will inerease the severity
of punishment with each recurrence.
In addition. Sutherland suggests that employees. particularly those in senior positions, set the ethical tone for the
entire organization When leaders model questionable. unethical or fraudulent behavior, normally honest
employees are more likely to rationalize fraud. Sutherlanďs theory holds the converse to be true.
Deterrence is usually accomplished through a variety of efforts associated with internal Controls and anti-fraud
programs that create a workplace of integrity and encourage employees to report potential wrongdoing. Fraud
deterrence can also be achieved through the use of continuous monitoring and auditing software tools.
Anti-fraud techniques and Controls include:
• An ethical tone at the top.
• A meaningful code of conduct.
• Open Communications with employees. vendors. suppliers and customers.
• Employee activity monitoring.
• Hotlines.
• Whistieblower protection.
• A protocol for punishing perpetrators.
• The monitoring of contractual parties.
• Proactive fraud auditing.
These items are inctuded as part of a checklist shown in Figuře 7 below. The deterrence fabric includes all
corporate governance professionals. including the board of directors. audit committee. top management and
extemal and internal auditors.
http://www.fraud-inagazine.corn/article.aspx7icH4294970127&amn;Site=ACFEWEB 1.9.2014
Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 7 of 8
Anti-fraud Controls to inerease fear of getting cought
Proper Controls design □
Controls operationol as designed □
Continuous monitoring □
Auditing software tools □
Punishment protocol □
Open Communications with employees, vendors, suppliers ond customers □
Proper employee octivity monitoring □
Effective tip hotfmes □
Whistleblower protections □
Monitoring of conlractual parties □
Anti-fraud environment to deflate possible rationalizations
Proper tone at the top 3
Strong, ethical corporate culture □
Workploce of integrity □
Meaningful code of conduct 3
Anti-fraud training programs □
The notion of deterrence tends to address two aspects of the fraud triangle: opportunity and rationalization.
When Controls and anti-fraud programs are introduced as deterrents, the fraudster perceives that the opportunity
to commit and conceal fraud has been reduced or eliminated.
The fraudster's rationalization may be deterred or reduced through training programs and a strong corporate
culture that command a high ethical standard. Deterrence efforts are observable and can be ušed to assess the
likelihood of fraud. The Figuře 7 checklist is a way to assess anti-fraud efforts aimed at addressing opportunity
and rationalization.
Understanding who commits fraud —and how and why it is committed — will enhance a professionafs ability to
prevent, deter, detect and investigate fraud.
Jack W. Dorminey. Ph.D., and A. Scott Fleming, Ph D., CPA. CMA. are assistant professors of accounting at
West Virginia University. Morgantown.
W.V.
Mary-Jo Kranacher, MBA, CFE, CPA/CFF, is the ACFE endowed professor of fraud examination at York
College of the City University of New York (CUNY), Jamaica. N.Y.; editor-in-chief of The CPA Journal and
president of the Institute for Fraud Prevention.
Richard A. Riley, Jr.. Ph.D., CFE. CPA/CFF, is a Louis F. Tanner Distinguished Professor of Public Accounting,
also at West Virginia University. He is chairof the ACFE Higher Education Advisory Committee, vice president of
operations and research for the Institute for Fraud Prevention and editor of the Fraud EDge column in Fraud
Magazíne.
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners assumes sole copyright of any article published on www.fraud-
magazine.com or www.ACFE.com. ACFE follows a policy of exclusive publication. Permission of the publisher is
required before an article can be copied or reproduced. Requests for reprinting an article in any form must be
emailed to FraudMagazine@ACFE.com.
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Beyond the Fraud Triangle Pagc 8 of 8
Reviews
By Richard_Riley
By Colleen_67
Excellent article! Finally addresses the chronic perpetrators! I use this in my presentations!
irtoirirtk
By Mohammad
Simply great. It was important to add the fact that the one who is capable of talking his or her way out very
confidently - is a red flag! in addition to the fraud triangle elements. I would like to thank the contributors.
By Birzeit Consulting ME
This is one of the best well-written articles about this subject. I would like to thank all who contributed to this
article as it is an addition to the experts' arsenal in fighting fraud and corruption.
ůitíttirk
By p47koji
Good stuff!
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iL A,,
By Kriz
Great article
ikitfakú
By Angel
Great updated information.
By Kimberly_2
By Chartes_73
very informative piece
ir**itr*
By Richard_64
This is a leap forward in the research on "why people commit fraud" I will quote this article in the graduate
course I teach at UW Milwaukee on Fraud Examination.
By Jonathan_14
Marks has been saying this for years. This article is further proof of his theory. http://bit.ly/fraudpentagon
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